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INTRODUCTION
The Brief of Appellee argues at length that Mr. Graham's wrongful
termination claim is preempted under the "indispensable element test"
established by Retherford v. AT& T Commc 'ns ofMountain States, Inc., 844
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). However, the Retherford indispensable element test
only applies to determining the scope of preemption after a statute has been
found to have a preemptive effect. It does not apply to the initial
determination of whether a particular statutory remedy has any preemptive
effect at all, which is the issue in the present case.
The proper analytical model for determining whether a statutory
remedy has any preemptive effect, in the absence of an express preemption
provision, is the "field preemption" analysis applied by this Court in

Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95; 61 P.3d 989, 991 (Utah 2002).
Under Gottling, an intent to preempt may be inferred only if the court finds a
"clear and manifest" intent to preempt on the part of the Legislature, based
upon specific factors, such as where the comprehensive nature of the
statutory remedy leaves no room for supplementation, or where the
recognition of a common law claim would conflict with the statutory
purpose. The burden of proving such an intent is on the party asserting
preemption.
1

In the present case, the District Court did not allocate the burden of
proof on the preemption defense, made no finding of a "clear and manifest"
Legislative intent, and failed to identify specific factors indicating an intent
to preempt on the part of the Legislature, as required by Gottling.
The District Court also failed to consider Utah Code §34A-6-l 10,
which expressly states that common law claims are not preempted by the
UOSHAct.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee has not contested Mr. Graham's Statement of the Issue for
Review within his principal Brief, which is: whether the administrative
remedy provided by Utah Code §34A-6-203 of the Utah Occupational
Safety and Health Act ("UOSH Act") preempts Mr. Graham's claim for
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. Appellee admits that
the District Court's decision upon summary judgment is reviewed on appeal
for correctness, without deference to the District Court's legal conclusions.
Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95; 61 P.3d 989, 991 (Utah 2002).

(See Brief of Appellee, pages 2-3)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts.
Appellee's Brief does not dispute any of the facts that were set forth
within Mr. Graham's principal Brief, at pages 3-4. However, Appellee's
Brief alleges additional facts, at pages 3-4, which are disputed by Mr.
Graham.
First, Appellee alleges that Mr. Graham "suffered a minor injury to
his back." Mr. Graham did suffer a back injury, which was sufficient to
require medical treatment and substantial restrictions to his work duties for a
period of over two months. [R. 55]. Mr. Graham was still on restricted work
duties at the time of his termination on February 10, 2017. Therefore, Mr.
Graham objects to the description of his injury as "minor."
Appellee's Brief states at pages 3-4:
"Albertson's contends that Graham's termination which was
originally initiated by Graham as a voluntary termination for personal
reasons and to focus on school, ultimately was a result of a
combination of factors, including various work-related incidents and
dishonesty by Graham." ( citing R. 0289-0294).
Albertson's has produced no evidence that Mr. Graham's termination
was "a result of a combination of factors." In the District Court, Albertson's
alleged several post-hoc criticisms of Mr. Graham's work performance. [R.
0289-0294]. However, Mr. Graham received no discipline in relation to

3

these complaints during his employment, nor were they cited in relation to
Mr. Graham's termination. To the contrary, Albertson's has consistently
asserted that Mr. Graham voluntarily resigned his employment. 1
Additionally, the "Argument" Section of Appellee's Brief includes an
important factual assertion, specifically: "that allowing persons to pursue
tort claims with more generous damages and a longer limitations period
would discourage at least some of them from making administrative
complaints to the Division ...." (Brief of Appellee at page 14). Although the
District Court made a similar finding (see District Court's Order at R. 567],
no evidence was produced in support of this assertion, and it constitutes
mere speculation. The one known specific example - the present case - is

1

Although Mr. Graham initially submitted a Voluntary Termination form to

Albertson's, his resignation was mutually rescinded when he disclosed to
Albertson's Human Resources Director, Carrie Burner ("Ms. Burner"), that
he had experienced workplace retaliation after reporting his injury. [R. 4].
Ms. Burner subsequently altered Mr. Graham's Voluntary Termination form,
without Mr. Graham's knowledge, to reflect a resignation date of February
10, 2017, which was the date that Mr. Graham was terminated. [R. 6-7].
Further, Albertson's written response to Mr. Graham's administrative claim
in the Utah Labor Commission states in part: "As outlined above, Graham
was not terminated he quit." [R. 101-102].
4

directly to the contrary, since Mr. Graham filed claims in both the Utah
Labor Commission and the District Court. 2
A. Procedural History.
Appellee's Brief states, at page 4: "The Division investigated
Graham's complaint and issued an Order that the evidence did not support a
finding that Albertson's had terminated Graham in violation of the DOSH
Act."
Although this is true, the DOSH Investigator also found that:
"Respondent has not alleged a cause for Complainant's termination as it is
Respondent's position that Complainant voluntarily terminated his
employment." [R. 68]. The Investigator also found that Mr. Graham did not
voluntarily terminate his employment. [R. 69]. The investigator further
found Ms. Burner's claim that she met with Mr. Graham on February 10,
2017 (to revise his resignation notice) to be "an allegation that is not
supported by the facts." [Id].
Appellee's Brief states at page 9, in part:
"On December 7, 2018, Graham filed a Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint [R. 0642-0648]. Among other things, Graham sought to
amend his Complaint to assert a claim for wrongful discharge in

2

Even where a claimant prefers the judicial remedy, the relative speed and
informality of the administrative process provides an opportunity for prompt
investigation and potential settlement of the claim.
5

violation of public policy based on allegations that Albertson's
retaliated against him .. .not_for exercising a right under the UOSH
Act, but 'for claiming and receiving workers' compensation
benefits .. ..'" (emphasis in original).
This statement incorrectly implies a degree of inconsistency between

Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claims based upon the UOSH Act and
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and thereby fundamentally
misconstrues the relationship between the two Acts. The reporting of a
workplace injury is both a protected action under §34A-6-203 of the UOSH
Act and an essential element in filing a claim for workers compensation
benefits under the Utah Workers Compensation Act, See Utah Code §34A-2407. Therefore, no inconsistency exists in claiming that a worker was
discharged for reporting his injury and also for claiming workers'
compensation benefits. 3
ARGlTh1ENT

I.

MR. GRAHAM'S WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIM IS
NOT PREEMPTED UNDER THE RETHERFORD
INDISPENSIBLE ELEMENT TEST.

Appellee's Brief argues at length that Mr. Graham's wrongful
termination claim is barred under the "indispensable element test"

3

The Utah Workers' Compensation Act includes an anti-retaliation
provision which expressly "does not affect the rights or obligations of an
employee or employer under common law." Utah Code §34-2-114(5).
6

established by Retherford v. AT&T Commc 'ns ofMountain States, Inc., 844
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). (See Brief of Appellee at pages 10-11; 15-20).
Appellee asserts that the indispensable element test provides an alternative
basis for preemption, in addition to "the more generally applicable field
preemption analysis applied by this Court.... " (Appellee's Brief at pages 2,
40). However, the Retherford indispensable element test applies only to the
scope of preemption once a statute has been determined to have a
preemptive effect. It does not apply to the initial determination of whether a
particular statutory remedy has any preemptive effect at all, which is the
issue in the present case.
In Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95; 61 P.3d 989,991 (Utah
2002), this Court recognized that, in many cases, a statutory remedy does not
contain an express provision for preemption. In such cases, the Court must
determine whether or not preemption should be inferred from the structure
and purpose of the statute. In order to infer such an intent, the statutory
language must "reveal a clear, but implicit, preemptive intent." Gottling,

2002 UT 95, 8. The present Appeal involves the issue that was raised in

Gottling, which is whether the statutory remedy at issue has any preemptive
effect; it does not involve the Retherford indispensable element test, which

7

determines the scope of preemption only after a statute has been found to
have a preemptive effect. 4
Notably, Gottling did not rely upon Retherford 's indispensable
element test in reaching its conclusion. Instead, the Gottling court applied
the analytical model for preemption that is set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 517 U.S. 25,
31 (1996) and other cases. (See Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ,r 8). In fact, the

Gottling court expressly declined to apply the Retherford preemption test,
which it described as a "very specialized test" and applicable only "where
the statute at issue offers a remedy for a specific type of injury caused by an
act of the defendant and where the asserted common law causes of action,
while based on the same facts, offer a remedy for a potentially different
injury based on those same facts." (See Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ,r 8 note 1).

4

This analysis is consistent with the District Court's Order Denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Granting Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Leave to Perform Discovery, dated October 12, 2018. ("District Court's
Order"). [R. 565-569]. The District Court's Order first determined that the
relevant Statute was intended to have a preemptive effect, and thereafter
determined that Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claim was within the
scope of preemption under Retherford. The District Court did not find that
Retherford provides an "alternative" basis for finding preemption, as
asserted within the Brief of Appellee at pages 6 and 40.
8

The present case does not involve the issue addressed in Retherford. Rather,
it falls within the scope of cases, recognized in Gottling, where the statutory
remedy does not contain an express provision for preemption.
In Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23; 997 P.2d 305 (Utah 2000), the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant was negligent in serving beer to an
assailant at a social event. The defendant asserted that the plaintiffs
negligence claim was preempted by the Utah Dramshop Act, Utah Code
§32A-14-1 et seq. The Dramshop Act contained no preemption provision
regarding the liability of social hosts. (Gilger, 2000 UT 2316). As in
Gottling, this Court applied general field preemption principles to determine

whether the Dramshop Act was intended to preempt the Plaintiffs claim.
( Gilger, 2000 UT 23 ,Il 1). The Gilger court expressly found that the
Retherford analytical model was inapplicable, stating:

Hernandez suggests that our analytical model for determining whether
the Dramshop Act preempts any common law causes of action should
be found in Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949
(Utah 1992). However, the Retherford preemption test only applies to
a specific type of preemption: where the statute at issue offers a
remedy for a specific type of injury caused by an act of the defendant
and where the asserted common law causes of action, while based on
the same facts, offer a remedy for a potentially different injury based
on those same facts. See id. at 965. In such situations, we have held
that the intent to preempt is determined by "the nature of the injury for
which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not the nature of the
defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for
that injury." Id. (quotation omitted) (alterations in original). Because
we do not face this narrow type of preemption claim here, we need not
9

engage in the analysis laid out in Retherford, although it remains fully
appropriate in situations for which it was designed. (Gilger, 2000 UT
23110).
Gottling and Gilger establish that the proper analytical model for

determining whether a statutory remedy has a preemptive effect towards
common law claims is the field preemption analysis developed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Barnett Bank and other cases. The Retherford
indispensable element test applies in determining the scope of preemption
after a statutory remedy is found to have a preemptive effect.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MR.
GRAHAM'S WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIM IS
BARRED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY UNDER
THE UOSH ACT.

A.

The District Court Did Not Apply the Appropriate Legal
Standards in this Case.

Mr. Graham argued in his principal Brief that the District Court failed
to apply the appropriate legal standards in this case by, inter alia, failing to
allocate the burden of proof on the preemption defense to the Appellant, and
by failing to find a "clear and manifest purpose" on the part of the
Legislature to preempt Mr. Graham's claim, as required by Gottling, 2002
UT 95 ,r 8. (See Brief of the Appellant at pages 11-13).
Appellee dismisses these arguments by reading additional language
into the District Court's Order. (See Brief of Appellee At pages 31-32).

However, the best evidence of the District Court's reasoning is the express
language of its Order, which contains no discussion of the burden of proof or
finding as to the Legislature's "clear and manifest purpose." These
requirements are important to ensure that preemption is not "lightly
inferred" based merely upon the existence of a statutory remedy. State v.

Jones, 958 P.2d 938, 940-41) (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481,491 (1987)).
In enacting a statutory remedy, the Utah Legislature is assumed to
have acted advisedly, Gottling, 2002 UT 95 , 8.5 The Utah Legislature has
often created express provisions for preemption where that was its intent.
The absence of an express preemption provision in the UOSH Act indicates
a lack of such intent in the absence of additional facts or analysis indicating
to the contrary, particularly where the Act expressly states that it does not
"diminish or affect" common law claims. (See Utah Code 34A-6-l 10(2). In
order to infer an intent to preempt where none is expressly provided, the
courts must :find a "clear and manifest" intent based upon specified factors,
such as where the statutory remedy is so pervasive that it leaves no room for

Utah Code §34A-6-203 became effective May 10, 2016, which is after this
Court's decisions in Gottling and Gilger. Therefore, the Utah Legislature
was presumably aware of this Court's decisions regarding statutory
preemption of common law claims at the time of its enactment.

5

11

supplementation, or where the recognition of a common law claim would
conflict with the statutory purpose. (Id.). The District Court's Order in the
present case provides no finding of a clear and manifest intent to preempt on
the part of the Legislature.
Mr. Graham's principal Brief further argues that the District Court
failed to cite sufficient grounds to support preemption. (See Brief of the
Appellant, 15-17). The only grounds for preemption cited by the District
Court are: (1) that claimants would be discouraged from filing
administrative claims by the existence of a common law remedy, and (2) that
a common law remedy might interfere with the "broader purpose of
providing for the safety and health of all workers" in some unspecified
manner. [R. 566-670].
As to the first of these grounds, no evidence or analysis has been
provided to support a conclusion that recognition of a common law remedy
would cause injured workers to forego their administrative remedy. It is just
as reasonable to assume that injured workers would utilize both remedies, as
Mr. Graham did, or that they would forego the administrative process in any
event due to its extremely restrictive limitations period and remedies. No
evidence has been produced regarding the filing or disposition of

12

administrative claims under the UOSH Act, or even that the Agency
considers its procedure to be exclusive.6
The District Court's Order states in part:
"[C]laims under the UOSH Act address the concerns not only of
individual employees but also the broader purpose of providing for the
safety and welfare of all workers through the broader regulatory
structure of the UOSH Act." [R. 566-67].
The District Court did not expressly state that recognizing Graham's
wrongful termination claim would conflict with "the broader purpose of
providing for the safety and welfare of all workers ... ," nor did it provide any
analysis which would lead to that conclusion. To the contrary, recognition of
Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claim would further the purposes of the
UOSHAct.
In Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71; 148 P.3d 945 (Utah
2006), this Court recognized a claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy based upon employer retaliation for the filing of a workers'
compensation claim. This Court rejected the employer's argument that such
claim was preempted by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and held that

6

Appellee's Brief responds to Mr. Graham's argument on this point by
stating it is "common sense" that workers will forego their administrative
claims in lieu of a judicial remedy, but provides no evidence or analysis in
support of that assertion. (See Brief of Appellee at 33).
13

recognition of such a claim would further the purposes of the Act by
protecting workers against retaliation. Touchard, 2006 UT 71 if22. This
Court's reasoning in Touchard seems to be equally applicable in the present
case.
In Gottling and Gilger, this Court conducted an extensive analysis of
the relationship between the statutory remedies and the proposed common
law claims. In both cases, this Court identified competing interests with
which the proposed common law claims would conflict - In Gottling, the
interest of protecting small employers against costs associated with
discrimination claims, and in Gilger, the interest of protecting social hosts
against costs associated with negligence claims. In each case, this Court
found that recognition of the common law claim would conflict with the
competing interest in a manner that was inconsistent with the intent of the
Legislature. However, there is no such competing interest in the present
case. Neither the District Court nor Appellee have asserted that the UOSH
Act is intended to shield employers who retaliate against their workers for
reporting workplace injuries. Recognition of Mr. Graham's common law
claim would not conflict with the purposes of the UOSH Act, but would
promote such purposes.

14

Appellee's Brief at pages 25-26 discusses various provisions of the
UOSH Act in an attempt to show that the UOSH Act is "comprehensive."
However, comprehensiveness for purposes of field preemption does not
mean merely that the statute is lengthy or detailed, but that it reflects a
legislative intent to exclude other remedies.7 Further, to determine
comprehensiveness, the court must focus on the particular portion of the
statute that is at issue. Craig v. Provo City, 2016 UT 40 ,16; 389 P.3d 423,
426 (Utah 2016). In the present case, although the UOSH Act contains
extensive provisions relating to workplace safety and employer records, the
portion of the Act devoted to anti-retaliation is very brief and limited. See
Utah Code §34A-6-203(1) and (2). By contrast, the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act, which was at issue in Gottling and Retherford, contains
extensive provisions relating to the investigation and resolution of
complaints, in addition to an express exclusive remedy provision. See 34A5-101, et seq. 8

See Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ~ 8 ("Thus, where a statute's plain language or
its structure and purpose demonstrate a legislative intent to preempt an area
oflaw, the statute becomes the only source of law in that area...." (emphasis
added).
8
Appellee' s Brief at page 19 cites the unpublished opinion in Johnson v.
E.A. Miller, Inc., 172 F.3d 62 (10th Cir 1999) in which the court held that "to
the extent plaintiffs wrongful termination claims are based on
UOSHA ... they are preempted ...." However, the court's brief statement in
7

15

The District Court in this case failed to allocate the burden of proof,
and failed to find a "clear and manifest intent" to preempt on the part of the
Legislature. Further, the grounds for preemption cited by the District Court
are unsupported by sufficient evidence, and fail to show either that the
Legislature intended to preempt the field of remedies relating to employer
retaliation arising from reports of workplace injuries, or that recognition of
Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claim would conflict with the
Legislature's intent.
B.

The District Court Did Not Properly Consider Mr. Graham's
Evidence Against Preemption.

In the District Court, Mr. Graham argued that the UOSH Act
expressly reflects a legislative intent against preemption of his common law
claim. (Brief of the Appellant at 17-18). Specifically, Utah Code §34A-6110 states in relevant part:
(1) Nothing in this chapter is deemed to limit or repeal requirements
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to supersede or

in any manner affect workers' compensation or enlarge or diminish or
affect the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries,
occupational or other diseases, or death of employees arising out of,
or in the course of employment. (emphasis added).

Johnson provides no analysis of the UOSH Act or the standards relating to
statutory preemption.
16

These provisions indicate that the rights created under the UOSH Act
are not intended to be exclusive, and expressly preserve requirements
"otherwise imposed by law" and do not "diminish or affect" common law
rights. However, the District Court's Order contains no reference to §34A-6-

110.
Appellee argues that the above-quoted language of §34A-6-110 is
limited to workers compensation claims, relying upon the heading of §34A6-1 l 0, which states: "Requirements of other laws not limited or repealed Worker's Compensation or rights under other laws with respect to
employment injuries not affected." (Brief of Appellee at 35-36).
As an initial matter, the title or caption of a statute is generally not
part of the statute's text, and is only considered where the statutory language
is ambiguous. Funk v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 839 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah
1992). Moreover, the heading of §34A-6-110 actually supports Mr.
Graham's position in this case, since it refers to "other laws" in addition to
workers' compensation claims. (Id.).
Appellee argues that §34A-6-110 is limited to claims arising out of
physical or mental injuries in the workplace. (See Brief of Appellee at 3536). However, Appellee makes no argument that Mr. Graham's claim fails to

17

meet that requirement. Mr. Graham's workplace injury is an essential
element of his wrongful termination claim. Appellee does not argue that Mr.
Graham's claim falls outside the scope of the UOSH Act. To the contrary,
Appellee's preemption defense is based upon the premise that Mr. Graham's
claim does fall within the scope of the UOSH Act. Accordingly, the
preservation of rights established by §34A-6-l 10 applies to Mr. graham's
claim.
Mr. Graham argued in the District Court that a legislative intent

against preemption is reflected within certain provisions ofR614-1-10.L.3-5
of the Utah Administrative Code which expressly defer to "other forums
established to resolve disputes which may also be related to Section 34A-6203 complaints." See R614-1-10.L.2. 9
Appellee's Brief argues, at page 37, that, since R614-1-10.L is an
administrative rule, it "provides no evidence of legislative intent." This is a
valid point. 10 However, the Agency's position with respect to the exclusivity
of its administrative remedy is relevant to the District Court's suggestion

9

See Brief of the Appellant at pages 18-21 for Mr. Graham's full argument
regarding R6 l 4-l- l O.L.3-5.
10 See Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507,512 and note 7 (Utah
App. 1992)("Agency rules are therefore of little value in interpreting a
statute unless the discretion to interpret the statute has been explicitly or
implicitly granted to the agency by the Legislature").
18

that Mr. Graham's common law claim might interfere with the
administrative process.
The District Court found that the deferral provisions ofR614-1-10.L
apply only to "arbitration and other agency proceedings." [R. 566].
However, that construction is contrary to the broad language ofR614-1-10.L
which generally defers to "remedies other than those provided by Section
34A-6-203" so long as they meet certain criteria.
Appellee's Brief at page 37 argues that the District Court's
interpretation ofR614-l-10.L.3-5 is correct, based upon the caption to the
Rule, which states: "Arbitration or other agency proceedings." However, this
argument elevates the language of the caption over the actual text of the
Rule, contrary to general principles of statutory construction, which are
applicable to administrative rules. Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 828
P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1992). Further, Appellee's argument misses the
relevant point, which is not that R614-1-10.L.3-5 expressly defers to Mr.
Graham's common law claim, but rather that the administrative remedy is

not exclusive. Since the administrative remedy under §34A-6-203 defers to
other forums to adjudicate "disputes which may also be related to Section
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34A-6-203," the administrative remedy is clearly not exclusive, and does not
preempt the field relating to such claims. I I
Appellee did not respond to Mr. Graham's point that numerous types
of legal claims may arise from the reporting of workplace injuries which are
independent from the OSHA Act. 12 The administrative remedy provided by
Utah Code §34A-6-203 cannot reasonably be construed as the exclusive
remedy for employer retaliation arising from the reporting of workplace
InJUfleS.

C.

The Limited Remedies Under §34A-6-203(2)(c) Support an
Inference Against Preemption.

Mr. Graham's principal Brief argues that the very short limitations
period (30 days) and limited remedies (reinstatement with back pay) under
§34A-6-203(2)(a) support an inference that the Statute is not intended to be

Notably, the Agency' s Rules expressly incorporate numerous court
decisions, supporting a conclusion that common law remedies supplement,
rather than conflict with, the administrative remedy. See R614-1-10.L.3-5
and cases cited therein.
12
Such claims include workers' compensation benefits under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code §34A-2-101, et seq.; claims for
private health, disability insurance and sick leave under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.; claims
for medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") 29
U.S.C. §2601 et seq.; claims for reasonable accommodation and disability
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42
U.S.C. §12101 et seq.; and claims of employer retaliation under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"), 29 U.S.C. §660(c).
11
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an exclusive remedy. It strains credulity to assert that the Legislature
intended to provide such limited protection for workers who report their
workplace injuries.
Appellee correctly observes that limitations on remedies alone do not
create an inference against preemption. (Brief of Appellee at 41, citing

Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ,r,r 8-14). However, the present case does not involve
an express preemption provision as in Gottling and Retherford. In the
present case, where the issue involves the determination of whether a
statutory remedy has any preemptive effect at all, narrow limitations on the
scope of the statutory remedy may be relevant in determining whether it is
intended to preempt alternative remedies.
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

Mr. Graham has claimed his attorney's fees in this case based upon
his breach of contract claim in the District Court. Such claim is not at issue
on this Appeal.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse and vacate the Order of the District Court
dismissing Mr. Graham's claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy on the grounds of pre-emption under Utah Code §34A-6-203
and remand the case for further proceedings in the District Court.
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